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Abstract
This article empirically analyzes the effects of terrorism on the electoral choices of the Turkish 
voters in the 1991 and 1995 general elections. It relies on a unique data set that includes the date 
and the place of burial of Turkish soldiers and police officers who died in the fight against the 
terrorist organization PKK. I employ the number of these security force terror casualties at the 
district level as a measure of the level of terrorism that the people of that district have been exposed 
to, and analyze whether and how exposure to terrorism affects people's electoral choices. The results 
indicate that Turkish voters are highly sensitive to terrorism, and that they blame the government for 
their losses. Moreover, exposure to terrorism leads to an increase in the vote share of the right-wing 
parties who are less concessionist towards the terrorist organization's cause compared to their left-
wing counterparts.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On November 13th, 2009, the Turkish Grand National Assembly convened to discuss the 
latest "democratic opening" initiative of the government. The initiative consisted of a package of 
reforms that the government believed would solve, or at least, help ameliorate the age old "Kurdish 
problem", and would put an end to the terrorist campaign which is argued to have stemmed from it, 
and which, for most Turkish people, has became synonymous with the "Kurdish problem" itself. 
Thus, the meeting was in the headlines in all the newspapers and televisions, and was expected to be 
a historical one. Unfortunately, not much of a discussion took place at the meeting as the members 
of the main opposition party left the assembly in protest when the prime minister, in his opening 
talk, blamed the opposition for not wanting to put an end to terrorism. In his exact words, the prime 
minister argued that there were those who built their entire political career on "terror martyrs", and 
that these politicians were actually hoping for the escalation of violence, and hence for more 
"martyrs", so that they could attend the funeral ceremonies and join the protests to further provoke 
the public against the government. His choice of words may sound peculiar to outsiders, but the 
prime minister was actually referring to the more than 6500 security force terror casualties that PKK 
terrorism claimed in the last 25 years, and he was arguing that these casualties hurt the political 
standing of the government in the eyes of the electorate to the benefit of the opposition. This 
argument has been made numerous times, by numerous politicians in Turkey over the last 25 years, 
but interestingly, it still remains as an intuitive one. In other words, no one has actually tried, so far, 
to scientifically assess the effects of terrorism on the political behavior of the Turkish electorate. In 
this paper, I employ a unique data set to investigate whether terrorism has had any effects on 
Turkish voters' electoral choices. Using spatially disaggregated data on military and police force 
terror casualties over the 1987-1996 period, I offer a multivariate linear regression model of vote 
choice as a function of these casualties, and a set of socioeconomic variables.
Terrorism is now considered the plague of our times, and researchers are probing this 
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common affliction in many different ways to find a cure. In the last decade, and especially after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, an impressive body of research that studies the correlates, historical 
and institutional causes, forms, and strategies of terrorism has accumulated offering us valuable 
insights into terrorism's relationship to some key structural variables like the economy, government 
policy, and democratic freedoms, into how terrorism works, and into the issues faced by 
governments in their efforts to counteract terrorism.1 More recently, academic interest has turned 
towards the effects of terrorism on the targeted populations. Economists have questioned the effects 
of terrorist attacks on various economic sectors and activities.2 In terms of political effects, a 
growing body of literature is now available with very interesting results about how exposure to 
terrorism affects people's evaluation of their political leaders' performances (Davis and Silver 2004, 
Shambaugh and Josiger 2004, Guilmartin 2004, Ludvigsen 2005). However, empirical studies 
investigating the effects of terrorism on the actual political behavior of the targeted societies are still 
very much needed. This is a rather important shortcoming of the literature because in non-
authoritarian societies, the political reaction of the people to terrorism greatly influences how their 
governments respond to terrorism. It is often argued that terrorism aims to pressure societies to 
coerce their governments to grant concessions to the terrorist organization's cause. If this claim is 
valid then whether terrorism is an effective way of coercion or not depends on how the targeted 
societies react to terrorist attacks. In democracies, the ballot box constitutes the main venue where 
people can best exert influence on government policies. Thus, we should be able to see whether 
terrorism is an effective way of coercion or not by analyzing the voting behavior of citizens of 
democracies that have been subject to terrorist attacks.
Turkey is one of the unfortunate countries for which dealing with terrorism has long become 
the top priority issue. Since August 1984, the country has been suffering from a terrorist insurgency 
campaign led by the ethnic separatist terrorist organization Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya 
Karkaren Kurdistan), the PKK.3  Turkish governments of the last 25 years have spent billions of 
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dollars to fight the PKK. 4 But the financial burden that PKK terrorism inflicted upon the country 
pales in comparison with the more than 30 thousand lives, both civil and military, that it claimed 
during the period. A lot has been written on the history, and the reasons of the conflict, and the 
"Kurdish problem". Over the years, many suggestions were made, many policy changes proposed, 
but interestingly no one has paid much attention to how this situation, which became "Turkey's 
number one problem"5, has affected the Turkish people and their political preferences. The results in 
this paper consistently demonstrate the importance the Turkish electorate has attributed to the 
problem, and how costly the issue had been for Turkish governments politically. Also, the analyses 
bring to light the significant relation between PKK terrorism, and the success of the right wing 
parties in Turkey in the 1990's. This last result also demonstrates that terrorism proved to be an 
ineffective way of coercion in Turkey since in the time period that the analyses focus on, the right 
wing parties in Turkey were less concessionist than their left-wing counterparts in terms of their 
stance towards the PKK, and on the "Kurdish problem".
This paper is a first in its attempt to empirically study the political effects of terrorism in 
Turkey. It employs a unique data set that contains military and police force terror casualties at the 
district level, and analyzes whether and how these casualties affected the results of the 1991 and 
1995 Turkish general elections. Consequently, it also contributes to the literature on the 
determinants of voting behavior in Turkey. This is a small literature which has so far been 
dominated by survey studies that link declared personal characteristics with declared ideological, 
and party preferences (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994; Esmer, 1995; Esmer, 2002; Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006).
In the following section, I present a brief overview of the terrorism problem in Turkey. Then, 
in the third section, I conduct a brief overview of the literature on the political effects of terrorism, 
and the literature on the determinants of electoral behavior in Turkey. In the fourth section, I present 
my model and introduce my variables. The fifth section discusses the data and how it was 
assembled. I present my results in the sixth section and conclude in the seventh.
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2. TURKEY'S FIGHT WITH TERRORISM
The Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK) is an ethnic Kurdish separatist terrorist organization 
that has been conducting armed attacks on Turkish citizens (both ethnic Turks and Kurds) since 
August 1984. The organization was first founded with the goal of establishing an independent 
Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, though later on in the 1990s, it appeared to have rolled back 
on its goal to a federational structure that would grant more autonomy to the Kurdish population in 
Turkey. First dismissed as the acts of "a handful of outlaws", PKK terrorism soon became "Turkey's 
most important problem".6  The PKK's terrorist acts are almost completely concentrated in 
southeastern Turkey which is the poorest, and the most underdeveloped part of the country, and 
which is traditionally inhabited by Kurds. The attacks targeted villages and civilians (mostly Kurds) 
whom the PKK named as "collaborators with the Republic", military bases, and police stations in 
the area. The lack of infrastructure, the mountainous terrain, and the economic misery in the area 
accompanied by high levels of unemployment, all worked to the advantage of the terrorist 
organization in their recruitment efforts, in finding shelters and hide-outs, and in staging attacks. 
Interrupted by short lived cease-fires by the PKK, the armed conflict between the Turkish security 
forces and the PKK has been going on for twenty five years now. It has cost the country billions of 
dollars, more than 30 thousand lives, of which around seven thousand are from the military and 
police forces, and hundreds of destroyed villages.
Turkey has a mandatory military service system which requires each Turkish man, when he 
comes to age, to serve in the army for about 12 months. These young men are first subject to a basic 
training program, and then are sent to military bases all over the country to serve the rest of their 
terms. They can be assigned to any military base that has room for newcomers except those in their 
home district7, and the assignments are randomly done, but considering the ongoing fight with the 
PKK, and the substantial military deployment it requires, there is a good chance that a young soldier 
will be sent to some military base in the southeast. Similarly, most public servants in Turkey, 
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including police and army officers, are subject to an appointment system in which they can be 
required to serve in any part of the country where there is need.8 Consequently, most of the police 
and army officers that serve in the southeastern districts of Turkey are not originally from the area. 
When a soldier or a police officer dies in service he/she is considered a "martyr"9 both legally by the 
state and culturally by the people. Legally, there are different types of "martyrdom" depending on 
how the person died (in battle, or in an accident, or due to health problems, etc.). The soldiers and 
police officers who die while fighting the PKK are considered "terror martyrs", and are the highest 
regarded both officially and culturally. A state funeral is held for each of them in their hometowns 
where they are buried. These funerals have always been important public events attended by high 
level military and state officials (even the president joins if he is in the area), and thousands of 
locals, and have always been the scene to nationalistic demonstrations.10 The funerals are publicly 
announced beforehand, and are open to everyone. Attending a "martyr funeral" is usually regarded 
as a citizenship and a religious duty. The national and especially the local media covers the story of 
the deceased soldier or police officer, his grief stricken family, and the funeral ceremony. Usually a 
cortege containing thousands of people following the cascade marches through the main streets of 
town on its way to the cemetery. In Turkey almost all cities and big towns have military and police 
force cemeteries which are called "martyr cemeteries".
Interestingly, these funerals constitute the only times most Turkish people face, and feel the 
adverse effects of terrorism. Since the PKK's terrorist acts are almost completely concentrated in 
southeastern Turkey, for people living in other parts of the country, PKK terrorism is usually only 
what they hear on the news about the recent attacks on distant outposts or villages in the southeast. 
It is only when a soldier or a police officer from their hometown dies in those attacks, and they see 
and join the thousands marching on the streets of their hometown following the cascade, that these 
people come face to face with a real, tangible loss. In other words, the security force terror 
casualties from their hometowns constitute the most tangible and important cost of terrorism for the 
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Turkish people living outside the terror stricken southeastern parts of the country, and the funeral 
ceremonies are the occasions when they really feel this cost. And the feeling is strenghtened and 
deepened by the demonstrations of public anger towards terrorism, the cries of the family members, 
and the nationalistic fervor at these funerals. Thus, the number of state funerals of security force 
terror casualties, held in a district in a certain period of time, provides a good measure of the costs 
of terrorism that the people of that district suffer within that period.
As can be clearly seen in Chart 1 below which depicts the total number of security force 
terror casualties over the years, the first half of 90s has been the most bloody period of PKK 
terrorism. The authority vacuum that formed in Northern Iraq after the Gulf War, created a safe 
haven for the PKK. The PKK militants stationed in the camps in Northern Iraq easily infiltrated 
Turkish soil and staged attacks. There were clashes between the security forces and the PKK 
terrorists almost everyday. Only in 1994, 1031 soldiers and 37 police officers were killed in the 
attacks. Nevertheless, the losses subsided significantly in the second half of the 90s as the Turkish 
security forces gained experience in guerilla tactics, and better learned to maneuver in the 
mountainous terrain. Finally, the PKK received a major blow when its leader Abdullah Öcalan was 
captured in Africa in 1999, brought back to Turkey, tried and sentenced to life in prison. Headless 
and divided, the PKK ceased its attacks in the early 2000s. Unfortunately, peace in the area did not 
last long. The PKK resumed its armed attacks in the second half of 2004, and the Turkish people 
started attending "martyr funerals" again in the last couple of years.
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Chart 1: Total number of security force terror casualties
Year
3. THE LITERATURE
3.1. Terrorism and Electoral Behavior
The literature on the effects of terrorism on electoral behavior is a new, and hence, a small 
one. Arian and Olzaeker (1999) examine the relationships between public opinion and policy during 
the Gulf-War crisis in Israel using data from two surveys that were conducted in 1990 and 1991 
respectively. They find that although the relationships between public opinion and policy are 
recursive in normal times, in crisis situations, the influence of policy on public opinion is greater 
than the influence of public opinion on policy.
Hetherington and Nelson (2003) analyze, within the American context, the causes and 
consequences of the "rally-round-the-flag" effect which they define as the "sudden and substantial 
increase in public approval of the president that occurs in response to certain kinds of dramatic 
international events involving the United States". They argue that the patriotism school, which holds 
that in time of crisis Americans turn to the president as a living symbol of unity, is better at 
explaining the causes of the rally effect, and that the opinion leadership school, which holds that in 
time of crisis opposition leaders stop criticizing the president is better at explaining the duration of 
rally effects.
Berrebi and Klor (2006) develop a game theoretical model to study the equilibrium electoral 
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behavior of a society targeted by terrorist attacks. Their model generates two empirical predictions 
about the effects of terrorism on electoral outcomes. First, assuming that right-wing parties are less 
concessionary compared to the left-wing parties, the relative support for the right-wing party is 
expected to increase after periods with high levels of terrorism, and to decrease after periods of 
relative calm. Second, the expected level of terrorism is higher when the left-wing party is in office. 
The authors then test these hypotheses by using a data set on terrorist attacks in Israel between 1990 
and 2003, and data from public opinion polls.
In a follow up paper, Klor and Berrebi (2008), estimate the effects of civil terror fatalities on 
the electoral choice of Israeli voters. Their work is a first in its attempt to derive results about the 
effects of terrorism on vote choice, based on actual voting behavior rather than personal declarations 
about party preferences. Their results demonstrate that local terror fatalities significantly increase 
the relative vote share of right-wing parties in all the localities in Israel. In other words, terrorist 
attacks have significant effects on Israeli voters' preferences, but interestingly voters turn to parties 
that are more intransigent towards terrorism rather than pushing for concessions. They also argue 
that terrorism polarizes the Israeli electorate based on their finding that in left-leaning localities, 
terror fatalities that take place in other localities increase the vote share of left-wing parties.
Bali (2007) analyzes the effects of Madrid train station bombings by Islamist terrorists on the 
turnout and the electoral choices of the Spanish voters in the 2004 general elections using survey 
data before and after the elections  Her results demonstrate the significant effect the attacks had on 
both the turnout and voting decisions of Spaniards, and explain the unexpected electoral upset the 
ruling party suffered from.
Gassabner et al. (2008) examine the relationship between terrorism and electoral 
accountability using a panel dataset containing more than 800 elections from 115 countries over the 
1968-2002 period. They find that terror has a robust positive effect on the probability that the 
incumbent government is replaced, and the magnitude of the effect increases with the severity of the 
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terrorist attack.
In this article, I focus on the results of the 1991 and 1995 Turkish general elections and, by 
using data on military and police force terror casualties, I investigate whether terrorism has had any 
effect on the electoral choices of the Turkish voters. In line with Gassabner et al.'s (2008) and Bali's 
(2007) conclusions, my results demonstrate that security force terror casualties significantly damage 
the political standing of the incumbent party in the eyes of the electorate. Moreover, the results 
allow me to draw a parallel between Klor and Berrebi's (2008) and my own findings, and argue that 
the positive relation between the relative vote share of less concessionary parties and terrorism is 
not limited to Israel, but is also valid for Turkey. In other words, when faced with terrorist attacks, 
the Turkish electorate, rather than pushing for concessions, assumed a more hawkish stance towards 
the issue.
3.2. Electoral Behavior in Turkey
Empirical studies that explore electoral behavior in Turkey are few in number, and are 
mostly based on survey data. In terms of theoretical background, the literature is heavily influenced 
by the seminal work of Mardin (1975) who argued that the center-periphery relations provide a good 
explanatory scheme to understand Turkish politics. According to this scheme, Turkish political 
system is composed of a coherent body of nationalist, laicist, etatist, educated, urban, "elite" which 
constitutes the "center; and a "periphery" constituted by the more traditional, more conservative, 
more religious, more rural and, in a sense, "antietatist" populations. The center-periphery divide in 
the Turkish politics nicely coincides with the left-right divide. The right-wing parties have always 
been supporters of peripheral values like free market economy, religious conservatism, family 
values, religious education, etc., whereas left-wing parties have appealed to the laicist, etatist values 
of the center. 
Employing the results of  a 1990 survey study, which was conducted as part of the World 
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Values Survey, Kalaycıoğlu (1994) examines factors that mold party preferences of Turkish voters, 
and concludes that the center-periphery framework retains its validity as a major determinant of 
electoral behavior in Turkey. He measures the center-periphery cleavage in terms of respondents' 
level of religiosity. Using the results of the same survey Esmer (1995) examines the differences and 
similarities among the supporters of major political parties in terms of values and attitudes. He 
emphasizes the role of the level of religiosity, and left-right ideology in determining party choice. In 
a later study based on a post election survey conducted right after the 1999 general election, Esmer 
(2002) analyzes the factors that affect voter preferences, and concludes that the most important 
predictor of voter behavior in Turkey is the left-right ideology, and that religious values prove much 
more important than indicators of economic well-being. Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006), based on the 
results of a 2001 survey, conclude that two dimensions dominate the ideological competition in the 
Turkish party system: the relatively more dominant secularist vs. pro-Islamist cleavage which 
largely overlaps with the center versus periphery formations in Turkish politics; and the ethnic based 
nationalist cleavage contrasting the Turkish and Kurdish identities. Çarkoğlu (1997) also has an 
aggregate level study in which he investigates the macroeconomic determinants of electoral support 
for incumbents in Turkey at the national level using the results of parliamentary and municipality 
elections. He concludes that while party attachments and loyalties are hard to break, Turkish 
governments, nevertheless, are rewarded or punished electorally for their economic performance. 
He measures economic performance by per capita GNP growth rate, inflation and unemployment 
levels. Akarca and Tansel (2006) study the results at the national level of twenty-five elections for 
parliament and local administrations between 1950 and 2004. Their results also point to ideological 
attachments as the most significant determinant of vote choice, but they also indicate that Turkish 
voters take government's economic performance into account even though they do not look back 
beyond one year. Their measure of economic performance is the growth rate of the per capita real 
GDP during the one-year period preceding the election, and the inflation rate in the same period. In 
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a 2007 article, Akarca and Tansel, study the district level results of the 1995 Turkish general 
election, and confirm that the national level findings in their earlier study hold at the district level as 
well.
Note that, none of the above mentioned studies control for the effects of terrorism on the 
voting behavior of the Turkish electorate. This serious shortcoming is not due to the lack of 
importance or relevance of the issue but rather is due to lack of data. To be able to measure the 
effects of terrorism on people's electoral behavior one needs a credible measure of terrorism based 
on a credible set of data which, up until now, did not existed in Turkey. Consequently, this paper is a 
first in its attempt to empirically study the political effects of terrorism in Turkey. It is based upon a 
unique data set that contains military and police force terror casualties at the district level, and 
analyzes whether and how these casualties affected the results of the 1991 and 1995 Turkish general 
elections.
4. MODEL
I propose a multivariate linear regression model to estimate the effects of terrorism on the 
vote choice of the Turkish electorate:
V{t,i}=α+βC{t,i}+δV{t-1,i}+γX{t,i}+ρE+φK{t,i}+ε{t,i}
where V{t,i} is the vote share of the party or group of parties on whose votes we explore the effects of 
terrorism at election t in the ith district; C{t,i} is the number of security force terror casualties per 
hundred thousand voters in district i within a certain period of time before the election t; V{t-1,i} is the 
vote share of that party or group of parties at election t-1 in the  ith  district; X{t,i} is a vector of 
socioeconomic, and demographic control variables at the time of election t in the ith district; E is a 
dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the 1995 general election and 0 for the 1991 general 
election to capture any election specific effects; and K{t,i} is the percentage of Kurdish population in 
district i at the time of election t. I employ the number of security terror casualties as a measure of 
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the level of PKK terrorism Turkish people have been exposed to over the years. I use the number of 
security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters rather than the absolute number since 
the population size of the district should also be considered in measuring the effects of terrorism in 
the district. People living in small districts have much more closer relations, and are much more 
aware of the happenings in their district. A funeral cortege of thousands of people marching through 
the main street is much more effective in a district with only a couple hundred thousand residents 
and a single main street than in a district like Istanbul with millions of residents and hundreds of 
neighborhoods each with numerous main streets of its own. I include the percentage of Kurdish 
population to account for possible effects of ethnic background on vote choice.
The analyses consist of two parts: In the first part I estimate the effects of terrorism on the 
government's vote share. In other words, I estimate the parameters in the following equation:
G{t,i}=α+βC{t,i}+δG{t-1,i}+γX{t,i}+ρE+φK{t,i}+ε{t,i}
where G{t,i} corresponds to the vote share the party or group of parties in government received at 
election t in district i, and G{t-1,i} corresponds to the vote share this party/these parties received in the 
previous election in the same district. In this regression, based on the expectation that the voters will 
interpret each casualty as a sign of the government's failure in dealing with, and suppressing 
terrorism, and will punish the government for their losses, I expect the vote share of the government 
to fall as the number of security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters increases. In 
other words, I expect β to be negative.
   In the second part, I estimate the effects of terrorism on the vote share of right-wing parties 
in Turkey. In other words, I estimate the parameters in the following equation:
R{t,i}=α+βC{t,i}+δR{t-1,i}+γX{t,i}+ρE+φK{t,i}+ε{t,i}
where R{t,i} corresponds to the vote share that the right-wing parties received at election t in district 
i, and R{t-1,i} corresponds to the vote share these parties received in the previous election in the same 
district. Based on the less concessionary attitudes of the right-wing parties in the 1991 and 1995 
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general elections compared to their left-wing counterparts, and the theoretical and empirical results 
by Klor and Berrebi (Klor and Berrebi, 2006 and Klor and Berrebi, 2008) I expect the vote share of 
the right wing parties to increase with the number of security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters. In other words, I expect β to be positive. 
Given that Turkey had right-wing parties as part of the government in both the 1987-1991 
and 1991-1995 periods, in this second part, I will also examine the effects of terrorism on the vote 
share of the opposition right-wing parties to be able to see how terrorism effects the vote share of 
the right-wing parties who are not weighed down by incumbency effects. Once again, based on the 
less concessionary attitudes of right-wing parties, and given that these parties were in opposition, I 
expect to find a positive β with a large magnitude.
   I estimate my model of vote choice using OLS with clustered standard errors at the district 
level. I cluster standard errors at the district level to account for the possibility of intradistrict 
correlation of errors.
One concern in estimating the effects of terrorism on vote choice might be that there may be 
a dynamic interaction between terrorism and vote choice. In other words, while terrorist attacks may 
influence voting behavior in targeted societies, terrorists may also stage attacks in response to 
electoral choices. In such a case, estimates of effects of terrorism on vote choice will be biased. 
Note that the situation in Turkey, and my research design does not warrant such a concern. As I have 
already mentioned, PKK terrorism has been almost completely concentrated in southeastern Turkey. 
That is, the PKK has not staged attacks selectively based on vote choice profiles of districts. 
Moreover, I use the number of security force terror casualties from a district as a measure of the 
level of terrorism that the residents of that district have been exposed to. Since there is no way PKK 
terrorists can know which district a soldier or a police officer comes from, there is no way they can 
selectively attack the security force personnel from the districts whose residents they want to punish 
in response to their electoral choices.
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5. DATA
5.1. Data on Security Force Terror Casualties
I assembled a unique data set on Turkish military and police force terror casualties, to 
empirically test my hypotheses about the political effects of terrorism in Turkey. The data set is at 
the district level, and contains the date and the place of burial for each security force terror casualty 
since the beginning of armed attacks by the PKK in August 1984. I spent 10 months and utilized 
numerous sources to assemble this data set. A detailed account of the data collection process, and 
explanations of the resources I referred to are provided in the Appendix.
After 10 months of data mining, I assembled a data set that contains information on a total of 
6538 soldiers and police officers from 81 districts, all of whom died in the fight against the PKK 
between August 1984 and September 2009. The period in between the 1987 and 1995 general 
elections, which is the period I will be focusing on in my analyses, harbors 3910 of them from 79 
districts. 
One difficulty I had to deal with is that the number of districts in Turkey has actually 
changed over time. In 1987, there were 67 districts. Then some towns acquired district status. At the 
time of the 1995 general election, the number of districts was at 79. But since 5 of these new 
districts acquired their status after the 1991 election11, only 74 of these districts are of interest to us.
Of these 74 districts, I leave out 13 southeastern districts. These are districts where almost 
all PKK attacks took place. As a result of the heavy and incessant terrorist activities and attacks, 
these districts were put under martial law in 1987, and remained so all through the 90s. I have 
several reasons to exclude these districts. First of all, the number of military and police force terror 
casualties is not a very good measure of the cost of terrorism the residents of these districts had to 
suffer. These districts have been the targets of PKK attacks, and thus, suffered heavy civilian 
casualties. Any reliable measure of exposure to terrorism in these districts should include those 
civilian casualties as well as the material costs suffered by the locals when their villages and 
15
livelihoods were destroyed, and they were forced to migrate. Unfortunately, no data is available on 
civil casualties or destroyed villages. Due to lack of data, I believe conducting a meaningful and 
credible aggregate level empirical study of the effects of terrorism on any aspect of the lives of the 
residents of these districts would be extremely difficult if not impossible. Also, martial law brought 
many restrictions on the daily lives of the residents of these districts, and the freedoms they should 
have normally enjoyed. Thus, their vote choices were made in a completely different environment, 
and were driven by a completely different set of circumstances, grievances, and demands. The 
martial law is hence another important reason why these districts should be treated differently.
Table A.1 in the Appendix displays the list of the 61 districts that are included, and the total 
number of security force terror casualties from these districts inbetween the 1987 and 1995 general 
elections. Chart 2 below provides a visual representation of the distribution of casualties at the 
district level between the 1987 and 1991 general elections. Charts 3 shows the distribution between 
the 1991 and 1995 general elections. Charts 4 and 5 provide a visual representation of casualties per 
hundred thousand voters at the district level in between the 1987 and 1991, and in between the 1991 
and 1995 general elections respectively. The first two charts reveal the lead of the big, crowded 
cities in terms of the total number. But, the last two charts reveal a different picture. When we take 
population size into account, it is the small cities of central Anatolia who lost more sons to terrorism 
than anywhere else in the country. 12
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5.2. Data on Political Parties and Elections
My data set also contains percentage of votes parties received in the parliamentary elections 
of November 29th, 1987; October 20th, 1991; and December 24th, 1995, at the district level. The 
electoral data is obtained from the Turkish Institute of Statistics. Turkey had 6 general elections 
since the start of armed attacks by the PKK in 1984, but I analyze the results of the 1991 and 1995 
general elections only. I leave out the 1987 election since most parties and political leaders were 
banned from politics in the 1983 election rendering it impossible to use the 1987 election results for 
the lack of results from the previous election.13  I leave out the 1999 election since the 1995-1999 
period was politically very chaotic. Five different coalition governments were formed during the 
period, none of them long lived, and one of them actually ousted by a "post-modern" military 
intervention. Thus, it is not even possible to identify who the government was during the period. 
Moreover, the party which received the highest percentage of votes in the 1995 election could not 
enter the 1999 election since it was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1998, and its leader 
and important figures were banned from politics for five years. Also, as I have mentioned before, it 
was right before the 1999 general election that Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was arrested 
and brought to Turkey. This event actually was extremely effective on the election results. The 
Democratic Left Party, who was in charge when Öcalan was arrested, increased its vote share by 
52%, and formed the new government. In that sense, terrorism has been the utmost important 
determinant of the 1999 election results. The 2002 election is also excluded first because some 
parties and politicians were still banned from politics, and second because it was right after the 
worst economic crisis Turkey had experienced. The election resulted in the landslide victory of a 
newly found conservative party, and the political demise of the existing ones. Çarkoğlu and Hinich 
argue that the economic situation and the frustration with the existing parties were the major 
determinants in the vote choice of the Turkish electorate in 2002 (Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006). 
Finally, I leave out the 2007 general election for lack of district level socioeconomic data.
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Table 2 displays the political parties that entered the 1987, 1991 and 1995 elections, the 
percentage of votes they received, and their general placement on the left-right continuum.14
Table 2: Political parties that entered the 1987, 1991, and     1995 
general elections, and the percentage votes they received
1987 1991 1995
ANAP (center-right) 36.3 24 19.6
DSP (center-lect) 8.5 10.8 14.6
DYP (center-right) 19.1 27 19.2
HADEP (extreme-left) - - 4.2
MÇP/MHP (extreme-right) 2.9 - 8.2
RP (extreme-right) 7.2 16.9 21.4
SHP/CHP (center-left) 24.8 20.8 10.7
The classification of parties on the left-right axis follows closely the widely used 
classification in Turkish electoral studies (Kalaycıoğlu 1994, Esmer 2002, Başlevent et.al. 2005, 
Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007, Sayarı 2007). Accordingly, the left-bloc includes DSP, SHP/CHP, 
and HADEP, whereas the right bloc includes ANAP, DYP, RP, and MÇP/MHP.
Amongst these parties, MÇP/MHP (MHP is the continuation of MÇP) has had the most 
uncompromising position towards the Kurdish issue. The party has always supported a military 
solution to the problem, and accused those who advocated political concessions with attempting to 
disintegrate the country. The leader of the party even threatened to spill blood to prevent any kind of 
political concession (Gunter, 1997; Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997; Beriker, 1997).
    DYP was also dominated by hardliners, and shared MHP's belief in military solutions (Gunter, 
1997; Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997; Beriker, 1997).
ANAP, a center-right party founded by the late Turgut Özal, had at first a more liberal 
approach towards the issue. But with Turgut Özal's departure from leadership in 1989, the party 
started to oscillate between hardliners and liberals, and when Özal died in 1993, it shifted for good 
to a line similar to DYP's (Gunter, 1997; Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997; Beriker, 1997).
The religiously oriented RP's stance was quite interesting though not very different from the 
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other right-wing parties in terms of political concessions. The party leadership argued that Kurds 
and Turks were all brothers under the greater umbrella of Islam, and believed that appeals to Islamic 
brotherhood would solve the problem, and that political concessions that bring up ethnicity to the 
forefront would be playing into the hands of Western imperialistic plots to divide up the nation of 
Islam (Gunter, 1997; Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997; Beriker, 1997). Actually, RP and MHP shared many 
aspects in their ideologies, so much so that, MHP members entered the 1991 election through RP 
lists.
All in all, the right in Turkey in the 1991, and 1995 elections was not in favor of political 
concessions.
The left-wing parties on the other hand, were more supportive of political solutions 
compared to their right-wing counterparts. SHP members have always been advocates of political 
solutions, some even talked about the need to discuss the idea of a federation for the Southeast.15 
Moreover, in the 1991 election, SHP enabled 22 members of the People's Labor Party (HEP) which 
was formed to be the legal political organization of the Kurdish movement in Turkey, to enter the 
parliament by including them in the SHP lists. This turned out to be a costly decision for SHP, and 
the costs started to surface on the first day of the new parliament when one of the HEP members 
attempted to take her oath in Kurdish, and another prefaced his oath by declaring that he said it 
under duress. Later on HEP was closed down by the Constitutional Court, and six MP's from HEP 
were arrested. The opposition parties, and the media accused SHP and its leader İnönü of "carrying 
the terrorists into the Turkish parliament". SHP was also the first political party in Turkey to issue a 
detailed report on the Kurdish question that included a number of major reform proposals. In 1995, 
SHP resolved itself into CHP, which, back then, held a similar position on the Kurdish problem.
The other center-left party, DSP, on the other hand, emphasized the economic side of the 
issue. The party leadership fully believed that the problem was economic, and thus, should be 
solved by economic means. It was the underdevelopment of the region that made it vulnerable to 
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separatist attempts. Their proposed solution was to demolish the feudal structure in the southeast 
through public investment and land reform (Beriker, 1997).
Finally, HADEP was a pro-Kurdish political party. Not surprisingly, the party has been the 
most ardent supporter of political concessions.16
5.3. Data on Socioeconomic Indicators
The data set also includes socioeconomic variables at the district level. One of the stylized 
facts of the economic voting literature is that voting reacts to a few macroeconomic variables, 
mainly unemployment and inflation (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). Unfortunately, there is no 
district level inflation data available for Turkey. Accordingly, I use the rate of unemployment, which 
is the number of unemployed per hundred persons in labor force, at the district level, and I also 
include the change in the GDP per capita in US dollars in the year before the election. 
The second socioeconomic indicator I include is the "infant mortality rate", which is the 
mortality rate in thousand infants less than a year old, as a measure of socioeconomic development 
in a district. Infant mortality rate is generally accepted to be a good measure of the level of public 
health services, education, and economic welfare in a district (Dinçer et al., 1996, Dinçer et al., 
2003).
In estimating the effects of terrorism on the vote share of right-wing parties, I also include 
the average household size in each district as a proxy to capture the center-periphery distinction in 
the Turkish society. The center-periphery divide in the Turkish politics nicely coincides with the 
left-right divide. The right-wing parties have always been supporters of peripheral values like free 
market economy, religious conservatism, family values, religious education, etc., whereas left-wing 
parties have always appealed to the laicist, etatist values of the center (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994). 
Household size is negatively correlated with the level of urbanization, level of education, and 
positively correlated with the level of religious conservatism. Thus, I argue that it can be used to 
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capture the center-periphery dichotomy.
The set of socioeconomic controls also include net migration, which is the difference 
between total inward migration and total outward migration in five-year periods, in each district as a 
percentage of the total number of voters in the district. Due to economic disparities among districts, 
Turkey has been experiencing heavy migratory flows in especially the last 30 years from the 
Eastern, Southeastern, and Central Anatolia, and the Black Sea region to industrialized cities like 
Istanbul, and to the Mediterranean and Aegean coastal cities. Consequently, net migration rates 
provide a good indicator of economic conditions in districts. Note that, as discussed in endnote 12, 
migratory flows also affect the distribution of security force terror casualties across districts.
The source for the unemployment rate, infant mortality rate, household size, and net 
migration are the 1990 and year 2000 population censuses. Population censuses are the most 
important, and in many cases the only, source of district level, socioeconomic data in Turkey. They 
were supposed to be conducted every five years, but unfortunately the 1995 census was skipped. 
Thus, I use the 1990 census results at the district level to construct my unemployment rate, infant 
mortality rate, and household size series for the 1991 election, and the 2000 census results for the 
1995 election. All series refer to the level of the variable in question at the time of the census. Even 
though the 2000 census results do not accurately reflect the socioeconomic conditions in 1995, it 
serves as a good proxy since it reflects the general socioeconomic development trend in the country, 
and the variation in the pace of this trend across districts. The net migration numbers refer to total 
inward migration minus total outward migration in each district in the five year period prior to each 
census. I use the net migration numbers in the 1985-1990 period as a control for the 1991 general 
election, and the net migration numbers in the 1995-2000 period as a control for the 1995 general 
election. The census results are provided by the Turkish Institute of Statistics (TUIK) and are 
publicly available. TUIK is also the source for the yearly GDP per capita in US dollars series at the 
district level which I employ as another socioeconomic control.
23
Finally the data set contains estimates of the percentage of Kurdish population in each 
district (Mutlu, 1996). These estimates are actually projections based on the results of the 1965 
general census which is the last census that included questions on mother tongue. Those who 
reported Kurdish as their mother tongue were taken as ethnically Kurdish, and the percentages were 
then updated using fertility rates and migration flows. Since these estimates are only available for 
1990, I use the same percentages for both the 1991 and 1995 general election.
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analyses.
24
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 1991 1995
Districts's security force terror casualties per 100000 
voters since the previous election
2.73 
(1.64)
12.91
(5.17)
Districts's security force terror casualties per 100000 
voters within 3 years of the election
2.39
(1.58)
9.43
(3.88)
Districts's security force terror casualties per 100000 
voters within 2 years of the election
1.80
(1.39)
6.94
(3.13)
Districts's security force terror casualties per 100000 
voters within 1 year of the election
0.99
(1.07)
2.74
(1.51)
Unemployment rate 4.76
(1.77)
7.53
(2.67)
Infant mortality rate 66.41
(12.45)
41.48
(7.32)
Change in GDP per capita in the previous year -2.06
(6.64)
24.51
(7.92)
Net migration as a percentage of voters -2.29
(5.79)
-0.91
(4.01)
Household size 5.12
(0.88)
4.64
(0.84)
Percentage of Kurdish population* 6.41
(11.69)
6.16
(11.24)
Number of observations = 117
The columns report the means of the variables listed. The numbers in parenthesis are standard 
deviations.
*: Percentages for 1991 and 1995 differ only because some districts enter the anaylses only for the 1995 election.
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6.1. Effect of Terrorism on Government's Vote Share
I first test the hypothesis that the electorate is sensitive to terrorism, and that people interpret 
security force terror casualties as the government's failure to effectively deal with, and suppress 
terrorism. If this hypothesis is supported by the evidence, we should observe a negative relation 
between the number of security force terror casualties from a district within a certain period before 
the elections, and the percentage of votes the ruling party/coalition receives in that district.17
Table 4 displays the results. It is clear that the Turkish electorate is highly sensitive to 
terrorism. The number of security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters has a 
significant negative effect on the percentage of votes the governing party/coalition receives. Each 
additional casualty per hundred thousand voters in the two years before the election costs the 
governing party/parties 0.5 percentage points. This is a very considerable loss considering that the 
average number of casualties per hundred thousand voters in the 2 years before the 1995 election 
was close to 7, which means in the 1995 election, the losses that the security forces suffered as a 
result of PKK terrorism cost the government on the average 3.5 percent of votes at the district level. 
Note that in the same equation the estimated parameter for the effect of unemployment on the 
government's vote share is -0.88. That means, in the 1995 general election, the government needed 
to improve unemployment by around 4 percentage points at the district level to offset the negative 
effects of terrorism on its vote share.
The effect is larger the shorter the lag is. Accordingly, we might expect funerals that take 
place closer to elections to be more effective on votes than funerals that take place long before the 
elections18. Unfortunately, I am not able to directly test this argument as casualty series with 
different lags are highly correlated.19.
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Table 4: Effect of security force terror casualties on the governing party(ies)'s vote share
Vote share in the previous election 0.584
(11.18)
0.580
(10.99)
0.573
(10.53)
0.589
(11.72)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters since the previous election
-0.254
(-2.40)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 3 years of the election
-0.392
(-2.58)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 2 years of the election
-0.503
(-2.59)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 1 year of the election
-0.648
(-2.00)
Unemployment rate -0.880
(-5.41)
-0.892
(-5.49)
-0.884
(-5.30)
-0.885
(-4.87)
Infant mortality rate -0.176
(-3.10)
-0.171
(-3.09)
-0.171
(-3.16)
-0.177
(-3.10)
Change in per capita GDP in the previous year 0.077
(1.05)
0.084
(1.13)
0.087
(1.16)
0.063
(0.88)
Net migration as a percentage of voters 0.034
(0.29)
0.025
(0.22)
0.031
(0.27)
0.053
(0.49)
Election dummy -1.948
(-0.70)
-1.684
(-0.60)
-1.965
(-0.71)
-3.077
(-0.95)
Percentage of Kurdish population -0.001
(-0.03)
-0.005
(-0.17)
-0.010
(-0.36)
0.000
(0.01)
Number of observation 117 117 117 117
R2 0.6827 0.6867 0.6895 0.6878
Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate OLS regression with clustered 
errors at the district level, in which the dependent variable is the vote share of the governing 
party/parties. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Governing party(ies) in the 1987-1991 period : ANAP
Governing party(ies) in the 1991-1995 period : DYP + SHP 
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The estimated coefficients of the unemployment, and infant mortality rate variables are also 
highly significant indicating the importance Turkish voters attribute to socioeconomic factors when 
they are evaluating the government's performance. The negative coefficient on the unemployment 
rate indicates that voters blame the government for the worsening economic conditions, and inflict 
punishment by switching to other parties. Similarly, it can be argued that an increase in the infant 
mortality rate indicates the worsening of socioeconomic conditions, which, as the estimated 
coefficient indicates, leads to a decrease in the governing party's/coalition's votes.
The low significancy of the estimated coefficient on the election dummy indicates that there 
are no significant election specific factors to account for when evaluating the vote share of the 
government. The estimated coefficients for the change in the GDP per capita in US dollars in the 
year before the election, the net migration rate as a percentage of voters, and the percentage of 
Kurdish population turn out to be statistically insignificant.
6.2. Effect of Terrorism on Right-Wing Parties' Vote Share
Table 5 displays the results for the second set of regressions testing the hypothesis that the 
vote share of right-wing parties increases with the level of terrorism voters are exposed to.20  As can 
be seen, the estimated coefficients for casualty variables are positive and highly significant. 
Moreover, as the lag gets shorter, the effect becomes more pronounced. It is clear that, PKK 
terrorism has done a great deal in winning votes for the right wing in Turkey. Each additional 
security force casualty per hundred thousand voters in a district in the two years before the elections 
adds 0.37 percent to the vote share for the right-wing parties. This number is very high considering 
that the average number of casualties per hundred thousand in a district in the two years before the 
1995 election was close to 7. In other words, in the 1995 general election, the PKK attacks that took 
place within the two years before the election increased the vote share of the right wing parties by 
around 2.5 percentage points on the average at the district level.
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Table 5: Effect of security force terror casualties on the right-wing parties' vote share
Vote share in the previous election 0.889
(33.12)
0.889
(32.89)
0.887
(32.84)
0.891
(35.47)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters since the previous election
0.239
(2.42)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 3 years of the election
0.359
(2.63)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 2 years of the election
0.374
(2.43)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 1 year of the election
0.504
(2.01)
Unemployment rate -0.132
(-0.84)
-0.114
(-0.75)
-0.132
(-0.85)
-0.146
(-0.85)
Infant mortality rate -0.049
(-1.16)
-0.051
(-1.21)
-0.050
(-1.17)
-0.051
(-1.18)
Net migration as a percentage of voters 0.165
(1.54)
0.163
(1.54)
0.157
(1.45)
0.163
(1.38)
Election dummy -3.741
(-2.14)
-4.062
(-2.40)
-3.286
(-2.07)
-2.112
(-1.28)
Percentage of Kurdish population -0.075
(-2.03)
-0.067
(-1.70)
-0.068
(-1.74)
-0.088
(-2.43)
Household size 2.304
(3.32)
2.167
(2.99)
2.262
(3.10)
2.589
(3.79)
Number of observation 117 117 117 117
R2 0.8372 0.8388 0.8360 0.8324
Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate OLS regression with clustered 
errors at the district level, in which the dependent variable is the vote share of the right-wing parties. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Right-wing parties in the 1987-1991 period : ANAP, DYP, RP (MHP entered through RP lists)
Right-wing partyies in the 1991-1995 period : ANAP, DYP, RP, MHP 
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Given the emphasis the left-wing parties devote to social welfare, social security, and public 
services, it is expected that the left will gather more votes in districts that lack behind in social and 
economic development. I would expect, thus, the coefficients on infant mortality rate and 
unemployment to be negative. As expected, the estimated coefficients are negative, but they are not 
statistically significant. Household size, on the other hand, is highly significant both statistically and 
in magnitude, validating once again the usage of the center-periphery framework in the analysis of 
Turkish politics. The estimated coefficient demonstrates the support right-wing parties get from the 
more conservative, more rural, less educated voters that make up the "periphery".
The net migration as a percentage of voters once again, turns out to be insignificant.
The percentage of Kurdish population has a significant negative effect on the vote share of 
right-wing parties. The magnitude of the effect is small since the Kurdish populations make up 
small percentages of voters in most of the districts included in the analysis. The effect might  be 
negative because ethnically Kurdish citizens are not supporting the nonconcessionary attitudes of 
the right-wing parties towards the Kurdish issue in general, or because ethnically Kurdish citizens 
are more likely to vote for the extreme-leftist, pro-Kurdish political parties.
    Election dummy is highly significant this time indicating the presence of election specific 
factors. One such factor might be the difference in the composition of the left and the right-wing in 
the 1991 and 1995 elections. As I mentioned before, MHP did not enter the 1991 election as a 
separate party. The party formed an alliance with RP as a result of which MHP members were listed 
under RP lists. Whereas in the 1995 general election MHP contested as a separate political party. 
Similarly, CHP, which is the oldest party in Turkish democratic history, and which was closed down 
after the military coup in 1980, returned to the political arena before the 1995 election.
One important thing to note is that Turkey had a right-wing party in the government both in 
the 1987-1991 period, and in the 1991-1995 period. In the 1987-1991 period, ANAP was in charge 
as a single-party government, whereas in the 1991-1995 period, the right-left coalition of DYP and 
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SHP formed the government. The results so far indicate that terrorism leads to a decline in the vote 
share of the incumbent while increasing the vote share of the right-wing parties. Then, it must be 
that terrorism has a high positive effect on the vote share of the right-wing parties in opposition. 
Table 6 displays the results of the regression in which the dependent variable is the vote share of 
opposition right-wing parties at the district level in the 1991 and 1995 general elections.
As expected, the number of security force terror casualties per hundred thousand voters has a 
large, positive effect on the vote share of the opposition right-wing parties. Each additional casualty 
per hundred thousand voters in the two years before the elections adds, on the average, close to 0.65 
percentage points to the vote share of opposition right-wing parties. This is a very significant 
amount considering that on the average each district gave 7 security force casualties to terrorism per 
hundred thousand voters within the two years before the 1995 general election. In other words, in 
the 1995 election, terrorism added on the average close to 4.5 percentage points at the district level 
to the vote share of the right-wing parties that were in the opposition.
I would expect worsening socioeconomic conditions to benefit the left-wing opposition 
parties rather than the right-wing ones. But interestingly, the estimated coefficients on 
unemployment and infant mortality rate are positive indicating that worsening economic conditions 
work to the advantage of the right-wing parties as well when they are in opposition . 
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Table 6: Effect of security force terror casualties on the opposition right-wing  parties' vote share
Vote share in the previous election 0.940
(13.57)
0.939
(13.68)
0.937
(13.43)
0.949
(13.26)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters since the previous election
0.376
(2.24)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 3 years of the election
0.610
(2.50)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 2 years of the election
0.648
(2.22)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 1 year of the election
0.628
(1.51)
Unemployment rate 0.456
(1.78)
0.496
(1.95)
0.466
(1.77)
0.415
(1.45)
Infant mortality rate 0.074
(1.05)
0.070
(0.98)
0.071
(1.02)
0.073
(1.02)
Change in per capita GDP in the previous year -0.171
(-1.29)
-0.185
(-1.37)
-0.174
(-1.28)
-0.135
(-0.99)
Net migration as a percentage of voters 0.095
(0.88)
0.091
(0.85)
0.081
(0.74)
0.095
(0.84)
Election dummy -2.843
(-0.82)
-3.371
(-0.97)
-2.402
(-0.73)
-0.940
(-0.29)
Percentage of Kurdish population -0.077
(-0.97)
-0.060
(-0.74)
-0.061
(-0.77)
-0.100
(-1.34)
Household size 0.895
(0.63)
0.601
(0.43)
0.733
(0.52)
1.382
(0.96)
Number of observation 117 117 117 117
R2 0.8058 0.8101 0.8065 0.7977
Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate OLS regression with clustered errors at 
the district level, in which the dependent variable is the vote share of the opposition right-wing parties. The 
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Opposition right-wing parties in the 1987-1991 period : DYP, RP (MHP entered through RP lists)
Opposition right-wing parties in the 1991-1995 period : ANAP, RP, MHP 
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6.3. Robustness Tests
This subsection presents robustness tests performed to the main results presented in Tables 
4, 5, and 6. 
In order to test the robustness of the main results, I enlarge the time scope of my analyses to 
include 1987 general election as well, and I run a fixed effect model that includes district dummies21 
to capture any district specific effects my original specifications may have left out. Note that 
because GDP per capita series at the district level only dates back to 1987, it is not possible to 
calculate the change in the GDP per capita for the 1987 election. That necessitates to either drop the 
GDP per capita as a socioeconomic control, or to use it in levels. Because both alternatives lead to 
very similar results, I chose to keep the GDP variable in levels. Moreover, I had to drop the "Vote 
share in the previous election" variable for lack of observations for the 1987 election. Note that this 
variable was intended to capture ideological affiliations and party loyalties at the district level. In 
the fixed-effect model, the variation in ideological affiliations and party loyalties across districts is 
left to be captured by the district dummies. The data for socioeconomic controls, namely 
unemployment rate, infant mortality rate, household size, and net migration are from the 1985 
population census results. Table 7 below repeats the estimations of Table 4 where the dependent 
variable is the vote share of the governing party or coalition. As can be seen the impact of security 
force terror casualties on the vote share of the government remains to be negative and highly 
significant with the exception of the estimated coefficient for casualties within one year of the 
election, which loses significance under this new specification. We can thus conclude that the 
impact does not change qualitatively.
Table 8 reports the estimated coefficients of the fixed effect model where the dependent 
variable is the vote share of right-wing parties. We see that there is no qualitative change in the 
impact of security force terror casualties on the vote share of right-wing parties. The impact is still 
positive and significant except for the estimated coefficient for casualties within one year of the 
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election which loses significance. Interestingly, almost all other control variables lose their 
statistical significance as well. The district dummies seem to wipe out the effects of socioeconomic 
controls.
Table 9 repeats the estimations of Table 6 where the dependent variable is vote share of the 
opposition right-wing parties. Once again, we observe no qualitative change in the impact of 
security force terror casualties compared to the original results. The impact is positive, significant 
and high in magnitude with the exception of the estimate for the casualties within one-year of the 
election loses significance under this new specification.
The results of this exercise are clear: the electoral impact of the security force terror 
casualties does not change qualitatively in response to the changes I have made in the model and 
time period specifications.
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Table 7: Effect of security force terror casualties on the governing party(ies)'s vote share
Fixed effect model
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters since the previous election
-0.784
(-2.56)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 3 years of the election
-0.999
(-2.53)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 2 years of the election
-1.240
(-2.66)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 1 year of the election
-1.238
(-1.60)
Unemployment rate -2.582
(-3.78)
-2.592
(-3.79)
-2.585
(-3.79)
-2.457
(-3.54)
Infant mortality rate 0.083
(1.07)
0.082
(1.06)
0.073
(0.94)
0.108
(1.39)
Change in per capita GDP in the previous year -0.001
(-0.20)
0.000
(0.09)
0.000
(0.08)
0.001
(0.45)
Net migration as a percentage of voters 0.125
(0.73)
0.109
(0.65)
0.108
(0.64)
-0.003
(-0.02)
1995 Election dummy 17.64
(2.15)
16.68
(2.06)
14.90
(1.88)
11.44
(1.44)
1991 Election dummy -4.66
(-0.93)
-4.85
(-0.97)
-5.52
(-1.11)
-5.84
(-1.14)
Percentage of Kurdish population -2.281
(-0.83)
-2.352
(-0.86)
-2.022
(-0.74)
-2.270
(-0.81)
Number of observation 172 172 172 172
R2 0.6378 0.6372 0.6394 0.6241
Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate OLS regression in which the 
dependent variable is the vote share of the governing party(ies). The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Governing party(ies) in the 1983-1991 period : ANAP
Governing party(ies) in the 1987-1991 period : ANAP
Governing party(ies) in the 1991-1995 period : DYP + SHP 
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Table 8: Effect of security force terror casualties on the right-wing parties' vote share
Fixed effect model
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters since the previous election
0.402
(2.93)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 3 years of the election
0.513
(2.86)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 2 years of the election
0.491
(2.32)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 1 year of the election
0.134
(0.39)
Unemployment rate 0.071
(0.25)
0.088
(0.31)
0.112
(0.39)
0.105
(0.36)
Infant mortality rate 0.035
(1.09)
0.034
(1.06)
0.028
(0.86)
0.003
(0.08)
Household size -2.614
(-1.53)
-2.586
(-1.50)
-3.288
(-1.94)
-4.203
(-2.47)
Net migration as a percentage of voters 0.025
(0.34)
0.032
(0.44)
0.049
(0.66)
0.101
(1.40)
1995 Election dummy -0.285
(-0.10)
-0.097
(-0.04)
0.032
(0.01)
0.099
(0.03)
1991 Election dummy 3.143
(2.07)
3.024
(2.00)
2.665
(1.76)
1.877
(1.23)
Percentage of Kurdish population -1.271
(-1.07)
-1.242
(-1.04)
-1.384
(-1.15)
-1.290
(-1.04)
Number of observation 172 172 172 172
R2 0.9432 0.9430 0.9415 0.9385
Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate OLS regression in which the 
dependent variable is the vote share of the right-wing parties. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Right-wing parties in the 1987 election: ANAP, DYP, RP, MÇP (later became MHP)
Right-wing parties in the 1991 election: ANAP, DYP, RP (MHP entered through RP lists)
Right-wing parties in the 1995 election: ANAP, DYP, RP, MHP
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Table 9: Effect of security force terror casualties on the opposition right-wing parties' vote share
Fixed effect model
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters since the previous election
0.870
(2.40)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 3 years of the election
0.969
(2.05)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 2 years of the election
0.985
(1.81)
Districts security force terror casualties per hundred 
thousand voters within 1 year of the election
0.189
(1.36)
Unemployment rate 2.167
(2.82)
2.167
(2.80)
2.168
(2.79)
2.102
(2.69)
Infant mortality rate -0.074
(-0.86)
-0.081
(-0.93)
-0.083
(-0.94)
-0.102
(-1.18)
Household size -8.044
(-1.83)
-8.420
(-1.89)
-9.583
(-2.21)
-10.61
(-2.48)
GDP per capita -0.001
(-0.43)
-0.002
(-0.60)
-0.003
(-0.79)
-0.003
(-1.04)
Net migration as a percentage of voters 0.066
(0.35)
0.103
(0.54)
0.129
(0.68)
0.210
(1.16)
1995 Election dummy -6.981
(-0.73)
-5.451
(-0.57)
-4.017
(-0.42)
-2.196
(-0.23)
1991 Election dummy 7.043
(1.24)
7.190
(1.25)
7.444
(1.29)
7.518
(1.29)
Percentage of Kurdish population 2.971
(0.97)
3.041
(0.99)
2.788
(0.90)
3.020
(0.97)
Number of observation 172 172 172 172
R2 0.8381 0.8357 0.8343 0.8320
Note: Each column reports the estimated coefficients of a separate OLS regression in which the 
dependent variable is the vote share of the opposition right-wing parties. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses.
Opposition right-wing parties in the 1987 election: DYP, RP, MÇP (later became MHP)
Opposition right-wing parties in the 1991 election: DYP, RP (MHP entered through RP lists)
Opposition right-wing parties in the 1995 election: ANAP, RP, MHP
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7. CONCLUSION
Turkey has been suffering from an ethnic separatist terrorist campaign led by the Kurdistan 
Workers' Party (PKK) for the last 25 years. Terrorism has cost the country dearly in many respects, 
and has been declared the most important problem facing the country both by politicians, and by the 
public on several occasions. A lot has been written on the history of the conflict, on the broader 
"Kurdish question" the PKK is argued to have stemmed from, and on the remedies that would solve 
the conflict. It is actually possible to group the proposed remedies under two headings: military 
solutions and political solutions. Those who advocate military solutions argue that the problem is 
solely a terror problem that originates from separatist aspirations, and that political concessions 
would lead to the disintegration of the country. Those who advocate political solutions on the other 
hand, argue that political concessions in terms of broader political and cultural rights for the 
Kurdish population would drown the PKK by strenghtening the loyalty of the Kurdish population to 
the state. Some scholars argue that terrorist organizations aim for governments to adopt harsh 
responses that would arouse sympathy in the public towards the organization and its cause (Bueno 
de Mesquita and Dickson 2006). Whether the PKK aims by its terrorist attacks to get the 
government to give a harsh military response that would alienate the Kurdish population, and would 
attract domestic and international sympathy for the organization, or it aims to get the government to 
grant political concessions in terms of enlarged political and cultural freedoms to the Kurdish 
population, is a difficult question. If we take the declarations of the terrorist organization at face 
value, it seems they aim the latter. The critical question is then, whether terrorism proved to be an 
effective tool of coercion. The results in this paper demonstrate that terrorism created just the 
opposite effect, and led the Turkish people to vote for hardliners. I analyze the effects of military 
and police force terror casualties on the electoral outcomes in Turkey in the 1991 and 1995 general 
elections, and demonstrate that the effects correspond to an increase in the vote share of the right-
wing parties, who, within the time period analyzed, were less concessionist compared to their left-
38
wing counterparts. These results indicate that the PKK was ineffective in reaching its declared goals 
since the damages it inflicted upon the Turkish people only caused them to vote for parties with 
more intransigent positions on the issue. It is also conceivable that terrorist organizations may have 
numerous goals which may lead them to face trade offs among their goals, and pursue strategies that 
may undermine some of these goals while help reach others (Kydd and Walter,2006). Still if one 
takes the declared objectives of the PKK at face value, the results here point to the ineffectiveness 
of terrorism as a way to coerce people to pressure their governments for concessions. Moreover, the 
analyses provide strong empirical support for the hypotheses that the electorate is highly sensitive to 
terrorism, and that they blame the government for their losses.
My results support the conclusions Berrebi and Klor derive from analyzing the effects of 
terror fatalities on election results in Israel, and hence demonstrate that their findings about the 
positive relation between the relative vote share of nonconcessionist right-wing parties and 
terrorism is not just limited to Israel, but is also valid for Turkey.
This paper is a first in many ways. It is the first attempt at measuring the political effects of 
terrorism in Turkey. This is a significant contribution considering that PKK terrorism has been 
declared as one of the most important problems facing the country, both by politicians and the 
public over the last 25 years. The analyses employ a unique data set, assembled for this project, that 
includes military and police force terror casualties at the district level, a variable that provides a 
good measure of the level of terrorism Turkish people have been exposed to over the years. Also, 
the paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of voting behavior in Turkey.
There is clearly more work to be done in this area. The relation between terrorism and 
political party ideologies is an interesting issue that remains to be investigated. Similarly, the effects 
of PKK terrorism on Turkey's foreign relations has not been explored. Such areas has so far 
remained unexplored due, in part, to lack of a good measure of terrorism. The data set I have 
assembled for my analyses provides one such measure, and opens the way to further empirical 
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studies.
Finally, my results may provide useful insights in analyzing the recent turn of events in 
Turkey. Most commentators tie the timing of the latest democratic opening initiative that I have 
mentioned in the introduction to Turkey's EU candidacy. The results in this paper point to another 
factor also. As I have mentioned before, PKK attacks dwindled in the early 2000s with the capture 
of its leader in 1999. Based on the results here, one can argue that the current government hugely 
benefited from the period of peace that preceded the 2007 elections.22 But recently, the PKK has 
given out signs of a new wave of armed attacks. My results indicate that if things turn back to the 
way they were in the 90s, the government will lose a substantial share of votes in the coming 
elections, and voters will turn to hardliners. Thus, this new initiative might be an attempt to preempt 
such a scenario, and pass the reform package before people change their minds about the way to 
solve the problem.
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9. APPENDIX
9.1. Data Sources on Security Force Terror Casualties
My main source for military casualties is a 5-volume publication, named "Şehitlerimiz (Our 
Martyrs)", published by the Turkish Ministry of Defense in late 1998. The publication lists the 
names, ranks, and place of death of all Turkish soldiers that died in combat since 1918. The fifth 
volume contains the list of soldiers who died in the fight against the PKK in the August 1984-
September 1998 period. In total, the list contains information on 5554 soldiers. This publication 
actually provides the most credible, and accurate information on military terror casualties as the 
information is directly taken from the personnel archives of the Ministry of Defense. Unfortunately 
place of burials, which are crucial for my analyses, are not listed. 
I referred to various other sources to find out the place of burial for each soldier. Similar to 
the Ministry of Defense, some local administrations, especially district governorships, have 
published albums on their local security force terror casualties. Most of these albums were 
published in 1998 on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the Turkish Republic. They contain a 
page for each soldier or police officer, including his/her picture, and a small biography with place of 
birth, family information, address, place of burial, etc.. These publications allowed me to identify 
the security force terror casualties of 26 districts.23
The internet has been a very important source of information. I have searched on the internet 
each one of the 5554 casualties on the Defense Ministry list. Moreover, I have conducted searches 
using related words like terror, "terror martyr", PKK, etc. and skimmed through thousands of 
websites that came up on these searches. I referred to some 359 of these websites.24 Most of them 
are e-albums of security force terror casualties on websites of local administrations including district 
governorships, district and town municipalities, and village associations. There are also websites by 
civil society organizations that are completely devoted to commemorate terror casualties. 
Interestingly, one other internet source that I referred to was geographical sites that enable map 
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searches. It is a custom in Turkey to give the names of public servants who died in service to streets 
and/or schools in their hometowns. I have tracked down some names simply by searching a street or 
a school in that name on the map of Turkey. 
Another important source has been the archives of daily newspapers. I searched through the 
daily archives of four major Turkish newspapers for news on terrorist attacks. Even though the 
newspapers have not covered all the attacks and all the casualties, they still provide information on a 
good deal of them.
I have also greatly benefited from the help of the Family Associations of Martyrs (Şehit 
Aileleri Dernekleri). These associations are very common in Turkey. There is one in almost every 
city. They are civil society organizations founded by families of soldiers and police officers who 
died in service, to help each other cope with the situation. Some of them are very active, and have 
their own websites containing information on those family members they had lost to PKK terrorism. 
I also personally contacted 28 of these organizations, and even visited some of them, and requested 
them to help me in verifying the security force casualties from their districts.25
I have also personally visited the "martyr cemeteries" in Ankara, Istanbul, and Bursa, three 
major cities in Turkey with more than a thousand security force casualties resting in their 
cemeteries. It turned out to be a grim project after all.
Finally, the Gendarmerie Museum in Ankara proved to be an invaluable source of 
information with its extensive database on gendarmerie casualties.
Obtaining information on the 320 terror casualties of the police forces was much more 
easier. The public relations office of the Administration of Security Forces was kind enough to 
provide me with the information I needed. 
Table A.1 below displays the list of the 61 districts that are included, and the total number of 
security force terror casualties from these districts inbetween the 1987 and 1995 general elections.
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9.1.1. Published albums on security force terror casualties
l Şehitlerimiz, 1998, Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Personal Daire Başkanlığı, Arşiv Müdürlüğü 
Yayınları.
l Çorum İli Şehit ve Gazileri, 2009, Çorum Belediyesi.
l Tekirdağlı Şehitler ve Malül Gaziler, 1980-1995, Tekirdağ Valiliği.
l Konya ve Karaman Şehitlikleri ve Şehitleri, 1998, Konya Valiliği.
l Erzurum Şehit ve Gazileri Albümü, 1999, Erzurum Valiliği.
l Elazığ Şehitleri Albümü, 1998, Elazığ Valiliği.
l Aydın Şehitler Albümü, 1998, Aydın Valiliği.
l İzmir Şehitler Albümü, 2004, İzmir Şehit Aileleri Derneği.
l Yozgat Şehit ve Gazileri Albümü, 1997, Yozgat Valiliği.
l Bolu Şehit ve Gazileri Albümü, 1998, Bolu Valiliği.
l Sakarya Şehit ve Gazileri Albümü, 1998, Celal Dinçer.
l Aksaray Şehit ve Gazileri Albümü, 1999, Aksaray Valiliği.
l Zonguldak Şehitleri, Metin Köse, 2002.
l Erdemli Şehitleri ve Gazileri, Ahmet Yanar, 2006.
l Kütahya Şehitler Albümü, 1999, Kütahya Valiliği.
l Muğla İli Şehitler Albümü, 1998, Muğla Valiliği.
l Rize Şehitler Albümü, 1999, Rize Valiliği.
l Polis Şehitleri Albümü, 1923-2002, İçişleri Bakanlığı, Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü.
l Tokat Terör Şehitleri, Ömer Faruk Aybek, 1998, Dilek Ofset Matbaacılık.
l Bitlis Şehitler Albümü, 1998, Bitlis Valiliği.
l Osmaniye Şehit ve Gazileri Albümü,1999, Osmaniye Valiliği
l Trabzon Şehitler Albümü, 1999, Trabzon Valiliği.
l Edirne Şehit ve Gazileri Albümü, 1997, Edirne Valiliği.
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l Kırklareli Şehit ve Gazileri Albümü, 1997, Kırklareli Valiliği.
l Cumhuriyet Şehitlerimiz ve Şehitliklerimiz, 1998, Afyon Valiliği.
l Kırıkkaleli Şehitler, 2006, Kırıkkale Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası.
l Kahramanmaraş Şehitleri ve Gazileri Albümü, 2009, Kahramanmaraş Valiliği.
l Karadeniz Ereğli Güneydoğu Şehit ve Gazileri, 1998, Ümran Demiroğlu.
l Sinop Şehit ve Gaziler Albümü, 1998, Sinop Valiliği.
l Malatya Şehitler Albümü, 2009, Malatya Valiliği
l Polis Şehitleri Albümü: 1923-2002, 2002, Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü.
9.1.3 Daily Newspaper Archieves
l Hürriyet, hard copy daily archives provided by the Atatürk Library, İstanbul.
l Hürriyet, electronic archives, www.hurriyet.com.tr
l Milliyet, hard copy daily archives provided by the Ataturk Library, İstanbul
l Milliyet,electronic archives, www.milliyet.com.tr
l Zaman, electronic archives, www.zaman.com.tr
l Cumhuriyet, electronic archives provided by The Sabancı University Information Center
l Sabah, electronic archives, www.sabah.com.tr
49
1 For an excellent review of the literature on the political economy of terrorism, see Bueno de 
Mesquita (2008). Enders and Sandler (1995) provides a review of the earlier literature.
2 For a general survey of the literature on the economic effects of terrorism see Frey and 
Luechinger (2005) and Frey et al. (2007).
3 The PKK is recognized as a terrorist organization by the State Department of the USA, the 
European Council, the United Nations, and the NATO. Although the organization changed its 
name to KADEK in 2002, and to Kongra-Gel in late 2003, it is still widely referred to as the 
PKK.
4 The current prime minister recently gave 300 billion US dollars as a ballpoint estimate for the 
incured financial costs of the fight against PKK terrorism.
5 In various surveys conducted in the last decade, terror was ranked the most important problem of 
the country by large percentages of respondents (Esmer, 1999, Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2000, 
TUSES 2002, Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2006, Kalaycıoğlu, 2009, Eurobarometer Autumn 2004 and 
onwards). For example, in a 1993 survey conducted by the Turkish Foundation for Social and 
Economic Research (TUSES) 45% of the respondents ranked terrorism as the most important 
problem of the country making it the most highest ranked problem. In a 1996 survey conducted 
by the same institution, 17% ranked terrorism as the most important problem making it the 
second highest ranked problem.
6 In November 1991, the then prime minister Süleyman Demirel described the "Kurdish situation" 
as Turkey's top problem. In 1993, the then president Turgut Özal, described the situation as 
"perhaps the most significant problem in the republic's history". (Gunter, 1997)
7 Home district means both place of birth and place of residence.
8 Police officers are subject to a rotating appointment system in which they are required to relocate 
every two to four years. Those who served in the west in their previous term are usually 
appointed to the east and vice versa.
9 The usage of the word "martyr" in the paper is solely because it is how these security force 
casualties are referred to by the public and by the state in Turkey. It does not carry any political or 
religous connotation on the author's part.
10 Extreme right-wing parties have often been blamed by other parties for manipulating the funeral 
ceremonies and the nationalistic demonstrations during these ceremonies to their own political 
advantage.
11 Ardahan and Iğdır, former towns of Kars district, became districts themselves in late 1992; 
Yalova, Kilis, and Karabük became districts in June 1995.
12 Note that I define a district's casualties as those whose funerals were held in that district. In other 
words, these charts actually depict the distribution of "martyr funerals" across districts. This 
point is very important in understanding the variation across districts in Charts 4 and 5. Usually 
families prefer to bury their sons in their hometowns. And because of the heavy migration Turkey 
has been experiencing in especially the last 30 years from the Eastern, Southeastern, and Central 
Anatolia, and the Black Sea region to industrialized cities like Istanbul, and to the Mediterranean 
and Aegean coastal cities, this hometown is in many cases different from their place of residence. 
In other words, a casualty who joined the army from Istanbul can be buried in Istanbul, but he 
can also be buried next to his grand parents back home which is probably somewhere in Central 
or Eastern Anatolia considering that most districts in these regions have very high outward 
migration rates. Consequently, the districts with high outward migration experience more martyr 
funerals then their actual population size indicates because some of their natives who had 
formerly migrated to other districts bring back their dead to be buried in their hometown. This 
pattern is clearly visible on the charts. Those red Central Anatolian districts in Charts 4 and 5 are 
among the top ten districts in terms of outward migration. 
13 Turkey had a military coup in 1980. Political parties were closed and political leaders of these 
parties were banned from politics and/or imprisoned.
14  The table contains the parties that received more than 1% of the votes.
15  Murat Karayalçın of the SHP was the Deputy Prime Minister in December 1994 when he 
advocated the need to discuss the federation alternative .(Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997)
16 For a detailed discussion of the stance of Turkish political parties on the Kurdish issue see Kirişçi 
and Winrow, 1997, and Barkey and Fuller, 1998.
17 Note that the distribution of casualties across time is based on the dates of funeral ceremonies, 
and the lags are applied in exact detail. To give an example a districts security force terror 
casualties within three years of the December 24 th, 1995 general election includes those 
casualties whose funerals were held in that district within the December 24th, 1992-December 
24th, 1995 period.
18 Note that this might simply be the result of scale effects.
19 Note that these series include two observations from each district: one corresponding to the 
period before the 1991 general election and one corresponding to the period before the 1995 
election. Because terrorist attacks peaked in the 91-94 period, for each district the second 
observation is much higher than the first. The correlation among the series with different time 
lags then comes mostly from this fact that all series alternate between low and high observations.
20 I do not include GDP per capita as a control variable in this regression. The regressions with the 
inclusion of the change in the GDP per capita in the year before the election yield very similar 
results with highly insignificant estimates for the GDP variable.
21 Note that, due to space limitations, the estimated coefficients for district dummies are not 
reported in the result tables. I will just note here that none of them is significant at the 10% level.
22 Currently, Turkey has a one-party government. The ruling party AKP has been in power for two 
consecutive terms.
23 The .... University Information Center Staff spent heroic efforts to find out and obtain these 
albums from libraries all over the country. Thanks to their help I had the opportunity to get a 
copy of "martyr albums" published by governerships of 26 districts. The list of these districts is 
given below.
24 Because it is a long list, I do not include the list of these websites in the references. The list is 
available upon request.
25 I must express my gratitute to the volunteers working at these organizations all of whom are 
family members of martyrs. They have been extremely helpful to me in my research.
